Abstract. Much attention has been given to efficient computation of pairings on elliptic curves with even embedding degree since the advent of pairing-based cryptography. The existing few works in the case of odd embedding degrees require some improvements. This paper considers the computation of optimal ate pairings on elliptic curves of embedding degrees k = 9, 15 and 27 which have twists of order three. Mainly, we provide a detailed arithmetic and cost estimation of operations in the tower extensions field of the corresponding extension fields. A good selection of parameters enables us to improve the theoretical cost for the Miller step and the final exponentiation using the latticebased method comparatively to the previous few works that exist in these cases. In particular for k = 15 and k = 27 we obtained an improvement, in terms of operations in the base field, of up to 25% and 29% respectively in the computation of the final exponentiation. Also, we obtained that elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 15 present faster results than BN12 curves at the 128-bit security levels. We provided a MAGMA implementation in each case to ensure the correctness of the formulas used in this work.
Introduction 2 Introduction
Pairings are bilinear maps defined on the group of rational points of elliptic or hyper elliptic curves [43] . They enable to realise many cryptographic protocols such as the Identity-Based Cryptosystem [10] , Identity-Based Encryption [12] , the Identity-Based Undeniable Signature [32] , Short Signatures [11] or Broadcast Encryption [21] . A survey of some applications of pairings can be found in [16] , [9, Chapter X]. These many applications justify the research on the efficient computation of pairings. Generally, let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over a finite field F p and r a large prime divisor of the order of the group E(F p ). The embedding degree of E with respect to r and the prime number p is the smallest integer k such that r | p k − 1. The ρ-value of the elliptic curve E is the value logp/logr measuring the size of the base field relatively to the size r of a subgroup of E(F p ). The Tate pairing and its variants are the most used in cryptography. They map two linearly independent points of the subgroup of order r of E(F p k ) to the group of r-th roots of unity in the finite field F p k . The computation of the Tate pairing and its variants consists of an application of the Miller algorithm [38] and a final exponentiation. Efficient computation of pairings requires construction of pairing-friendly elliptic curves over F p with prescribed embedding degree k (see for example [8] or [18] ) and efficient arithmetic in the towering fields associated to F p k (see [29] , [22] , [27] , [14] ). A lot of work has been done for shortening the Miller loop leading to the concept of pairing lattices [24] , or the optimal pairing described by Vercauteren which can be computed with the smallest number of iterations in the Miller algorithm [42] . Due to these advances, the final exponentiation step has became a serious task. In this work, we concentrate on elliptic curves E over F p with embedding degree 9, 15 and 27. These curves admit twists of degree three which enable computations to Table 1 . Bit sizes of curves parameters and corresponding embedding degrees to obtain commonly desired levels of security.
be done in subfields and also lead to the denominator elimination technique. To our knowledge just few works ( [31] , [39] and [44] ) exist in these cases and much attention have been given only to elliptic curves with even embedding degree (see for example [1] , [19] , [20] , [36] ). Also, another motivation to our work is the recent results on the resolution of discrete logarithm problem [28] . Indeed according to the first analysis of this article, as for instance in [23] , [4] the security level for elliptic curves with friable embedding degree should be taken greater than those presented in Table 1 . The main consequence is that elliptic curves with embedding degree 12 or 18 may not be the one assuring a nice ratio between the security level and the arithmetic. Elliptic curves with odd embedding degree could become interesting and more efficient than elliptic curves with even embedding degree. Also it is also noticed that elliptic curves with odd embedding degree especially with k = 27 may be suitable for computing product of pairings [44] . In this work we consider the following parameter's sizes (p ≈ 2 343 , r ≈ 2 257 , ρ = 1.33), (p ≈ 2 575 , r ≈ 2 385 , ρ = 1.5), (p ≈ 2 579 , r ≈ 2 514 , ρ = 1.12) for curves with k = 9, 15, 27 respectively. This corresponds to the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels respectively according to recommendations in Table 1 [18] . However, considering the recent recommendations based on the advances on Discrete Logarithm computation with the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm and its variants ( [28] , [5] , [37] , [4] ) the security level provided by the above parameters may reduce. Indeed, let 2 −d exp((c + o(1))(logQ) 1/3 ( log logQ) 2/3 where d and c are constants, be the runing time of the NFS algorithm, with Q = p k . The base-two logarithm of this runtime with (o(1) = 0) gives S(Q, c, d) = c(lge)(logQ) 1/3 (loglogQ) 2/3 − d. We then know that the constants c and d, the embedding degree k and the security level l must satisfy the following Pollard-Rho security and variants of NFS security constraints logQ/k ≥ 2ρl and S(Q, c, d) ≥ l. Therefore the previous parameters provide a security level of 109, 168, 214 bits instead of 128, 192, 256-bit respectively for curves with k = 9, 15, 27. But for now we still consider in Section 5, 6 and 7 recommendation from Table 1 in order to make a fair comparison with previous works. Later in section 9, we consider advances in discrete logarithm computation and provide tentative updated parameters at the 128, 192, 256 bits respectively for curves with k = 9, 15, 27. So we proposed a detailed arithmetic in the towering fields associated to the fields F p 9 , F p 15 and F p 27 . The latticebased method explained by Fuentes et al. [19] is applied to compute the final exponentiation in the cases k = 9, 15. We also find a simple expression and explicit cost evaluation for the optimal pairing in the cases k = 9 and k = 15 comparatively to the work in [39] . The results obtained are an improvement with respect to previous works [31] , [39] and [44] respectively for k = 9, 15 and 27. Precisely, our contributions (see Table 3 and subsection 9.4 for comparison) in this work are:
1. Determination of an explicit cost of the computation of the optimal pairing for elliptic curves stated above. This includes a good selection of parameters for a shorter Miller loop and an efficient exponentiation. In particular, we saved one inversion in F p 27 for the computation of the Miller loop in the case k = 27. 2. Details on the arithmetic in the tower of subfields of F p 9 , F p 15 and F p 27 . Especially, we give the cost of the computation of Frobenius maps and Inversions in the cyclotomic subgroups of F * p 9 , F * p 15 and F * p 27 , (see Appendices A, B and C). 3. Improvement of the costs of the final exponentiation by saving 828M 1 + 145S 1 , 1170M 1 + 7767S 1 and 8676M 1 + 32136S 1 operations for elliptic curves of embedding degrees 9, 15 and 27 respectively, comparatively to previous works in these cases; where M k , S k represent the costs of multiplication and squaring in the finite field F p k . 4. In Section 9 we look for new parameters considering the advances in Discrete Logarithm computation to update the cost of the optimal ate pairings on the studied curves at the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels. We then compare our results with known curves such as BN and BLS curves. In particular we obtained that elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 15 present faster results than BN12 curves at the 128-bit security levels.
We also provide a MAGMA implementation in each case to ensure the correctness of the formulas used in this work. The code is available in [17] . The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 3 we briefly present the Tate and ate pairings together with the Miller algorithm for their efficient computation, we also recall the concept of optimal ate pairing and the lattice-based method for computing the final exponentiation. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present arithmetic in subfields, and costs estimation of the Miller step and the final exponentiation when considering the embedding degrees k = 9, 15 and 27 respectively. Each of these sections includes a comparative analysis with previous work. Section 8 presents a general comparison of the results obtained in this work and the previous results in the literature. In Section 9 we look for new parameters considering the advances in Discrete Logarithm computation to update the cost of the optimal ate pairings on the studied curves at the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels. We then compare our results with known curves such as BN and BLS curves. We conclude the work in Section 10 in which we suggest as future work the search for parameters to have subgroup secure ordinary curves [6] and to ensure protection against small-subgroup attacks [34] .
Notations
The following notations are used in this work. M k , S k , I k : Cost of multiplication, squaring and inversion in the field F p k , for any integer k.
3 Background and previous works
Pairings and the Miller Algorithm
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over F p , a finite field of characteristic p > 3. Let r be a large prime factor of the group order of the elliptic curve. Let m ∈ Z and P ∈ E(F p )[r] a point of E of order r with coordinates in F p . Let f m,P a function with divisor Div (f m,P ) =
where O denotes the identity element of the group of points of the elliptic curve. We denote k the smallest integer such that r divides p k − 1, also called the embedding degree of E with respect to r. We also consider the point Q ∈ E(F p k )[r] of E of order r with coordinates in F p k and denote µ r the group of r-th roots of unity in F * p k . The reduced Tate pairing e r is a bilinear and non degenerate map defined as
To define a variant of the Tate pairing called ate pairing [25] , let's denote [i] : P −→ [i]P the endomorphism defined on E(F p ) which consists to add P to itself i times. Let 
The ate pairing is defined as follows:
In all variants of pairings, one needs a value f m,U (V ) which is efficiently computed thanks to the Miller algorithm [38] . Indeed denote h R,S a rational function with divisor Div(h R,S ) = (R)+(S)−(S +R)−(O) where R and S are two arbitrary points on the elliptic curve. In the case of elliptic curves in Weierstrass form, h R,S = ℓ R,S v R+S where ℓ R,S is the straight line containing R and S and v R+S is the corresponding vertical line passing through R + S. Miller uses the doubleand-add method as the addition chains for m (see [3, Chapter 9] for more details on addition chains) to compute f := f m,U (V ). Write m = m n 2 n +...+m 1 2+m 0 > 0 with m i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, the (modified) Miller algorithm that efficiently computes the pairing f m,U (V ) (p k −1)/r of two points U and V is given as follows:
:
Final exponentiation
The use of twists enables to efficiently do some computations during the execution of this algorithm as we explain in the next section.
Use of Twists
Twists of elliptic curves enable to efficiently compute pairings. Indeed, in the Miller algorithm the doubling of a point (line 3) and the addition of points (lines 6 and 8) are done in the extension field F p k in the case of the ate pairing. The use of twists enables to perform these operations rather in a subfield of F p k and also leads to the denominator elimination. More precisely, a twist of an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field F p is an elliptic curve E ′ defined over F p which is isomorphic to E over an algebraic closure of F p . The smallest integer d such that E and E ′ are isomorphic over F p d is called the degree or the order of the twist. Elliptic curves of embedding degree k = 9, 15 and k = 27 admit twists of order three. Explicit constructions of such curves can be found in [35] , [15] and [7] . The general equation of these curves is given by E : y 2 = x 3 + b. The equation defining the twist E ′ has the form y 2 = x 3 + bω 6 where {1, ω, ω 2 } is the basis of the F p k/3 -vector space F p k and the isomorphism between E ′ and E is ψ :
where λ is the slope of the line passing through R and S. Observe that using the equation of the curve
R+S
. In the present case of ate pairing, the addition R + S is performed in the extension field F p k and the function h R,S is evaluated at a point (x P , y P ) ∈ E(F p ). So using the twist, the points R, S and R + S are taken in the form (xω −2 , yω −3 ) where (x, y) ∈ E ′ (F p k/3 ). Therefore we have
. We observe that the denominator is an element of the subfield F p k/3 and so will be sent to 1 during the final exponentiation (line 10 in the Miller algorithm) since p k/3 − 1 is a factor of (p k − 1)/r. Consequently we simply ignore that denominator in the Miller algorithm for an efficient computation. More details on twists can be found in [13] .
Optimal Pairings
The reduction of Miller's loop length is an important way to improve the computation of pairings.
The latest work is a generalized method to find the shortest loop, which leads to the concept of optimal pairings due to Vercauteren [42] . Let λ = mr be a multiple of r such that r ∤ m and
defines a bilinear pairing and non degenerate if 
Final Exponentiation and the Lattice-Based Method for its Computation
The result of the Miller loop's step is raised to the power
r . This step is called the final exponentiation (line 10 in Miller's algorithm). The efficient computation of the final exponentiation has became a serious task. Observe that this exponent can be divided into two parts as follows:
where φ k (x) is the k-th cyclotomic polynomial. The final exponentiation is therefore computed
as it consists of few multiplications, inversion and p-th powering in
is considered more difficult and is called the hard part. An efficient method to compute the hard part is described by Scott et al. [40] . They suggested to write d =
and find a short vectorial addition chains to compute A d much more efficiently than the naive method. In [19] , based on the fact that a fixed power of a pairing is still a pairing, Fuentes et al. [19] suggested to apply Scott et al.'s method with a power of any multiple d ′ of d with r not dividing d ′ . This could lead to a more efficient exponentiation than computing A d directly. Their idea of finding the polynomial d ′ (x) is to apply the LLL-algorithm to the matrix formed by Q-linear combinations of the elements d(x), xd(x), ..., x degr−1 d(x). They successfully applied the method in the case of elliptic curves of embedding degrees 8, 12 and 18 [19] . In Sections 5 and 6 we apply this method to improve the computation of the final exponentiation for elliptic curves of embedding degree k = 9 and 15. A clever method was used by Zhang et al. [44] to compute the final exponentiation in the case k = 27.
4 Arithmetic in the tower of subfields of F p 9 , F p 27 and F p 15 A pairing is computed as an element of the extension field F p k . But its efficient computation depends on the arithmetic of subfields of F p k which is generally organised as tower of subfields extensions. In this section we recall the tower extension of finite fields F p 9 , F p 27 and F p 15 . We also give explicit cost of the arithmetic operations. For extension-field arithmetic in F p 9 and F p 27 we consider p ≡ 1 mod 3 motivated by the work of Barreto et al. [7] on the construction of elliptic curves of embedding degree 9 and 27. This implies that F p k can be represented as
where α is a cubic non residue modulo p. We choose p such that X 3 − 7 is irreducible over F p . Therefore cubic extensions will be constructed using the polynomials X 3 − α i where α i = 7 1/3 i−1 . A tower extension for F p 27 together with the one for F p 9 are then given by:
The costs of the computation of the Frobenius maps and cyclotomic inversions are given in Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 for the extension F p 9 , F p 27 , and F p 15 respectively. The proof of these Lemmas are given in Appendix A, B and C. 
Our main contribution in this section is the computation of Frobenius maps and the inversions in the φ n (.)-order cyclotomic subgroup of F * p k . The costs of the computation of the Frobenius maps and cyclotomic inversions are given in Lemma 3. In Table 2 we summarise the overall cost of operations in the tower of subfields described above. The costs for squaring, multiplication and inversion are from [31] , [39] and [44] respectively for k = 9, 15 and 27. Explicit details of the cost of Frobenius maps and inversions in the cyclotomic subgroups are given in Appendix A, B and C.
Fields Operations
Costs Table 2 . Cost of operations in extension fields from [31] , [39] and [44] and this work (see Appendix A, B and C)
Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 9
This section describes the computation of the optimal ate pairing (Miller step and the final exponentiation) on the parameterized elliptic curve defined in [35] . The correctness of the results can be verified with the MAGMA code available in [17] . This family of elliptic curves has embedding degree 9 and a ρ-value 1.33 and is parameterized by :
Optimal ate pairing
Based on the general framework described by Vercauteren in [42] , the short vector obtained from the lattice L defined by equation (2) gives the optimal function h(z) =
A straightforward application of formula (1) yields the optimal pairing
Cost of the execution of the Miller loop
The and the cost of the addition step is 9M 1 + 12M 3 + 5S 3 . For an explicit cost of the computation of f x,Q (P ), we wrote a Pari/GP code to find a suitable x with low Hamming weight and minimal number of bits for the 128 bit-security level according to Table 1 . The best value we were able to find is x = 2 43 + 2 37 + 2 7 + 1 which gives an r(x) prime of 257 bits and p(x) a prime of 343 bits. The values p and x are both congruent to 1 modulo 6 so that the corresponding elliptic curve is y 2 = x 3 + 1 [31] . The computation of f x,Q (P ) therefore costs 43 doubling steps, 3 additions, 42 squaring and 45 multiplications in F p 9 . Thus the total cost for the computation of the Miller loop for the optimal pairing on elliptic curves of embedding degree 9 is 43(
. This is equal to 45M 9 + 165M 3 + 414M 1 + 42S 9 + 402S 3 . Using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost is 3024M 1 + 3060S 1 . To our knowledge, no other explicit cost with a specific value of x is reported in the literature.
Cost of the computation of the final exponentiation
As explained in Section 3, the final exponentiation in this case can be divided as f (p 9 −1)/r =
. We then used the lattice method described by Fuentes et al. [19] that we briefly explained in Section 3.4. It is applied to the following matrix in which the coefficient 243 is used to obtain integer entries as d = (p 6 + p 3 + 1)/r is a polynomial with rational coefficients
We
They verify the relations (see the code in [17] for verification)
If we set A = f p 3 −1 then -The cost for the computation of A is 1 p 3 -Frobenius, 1 Inversion in F p 9 and 1 multiplication in F p 9 . -The cost of the computation of A k 0 , A k 1 and A k 4 is 3 exponentiations by x, -The cost of the computation of A k 5 is one inversion in the cylotomic subgroup and one exponentiation by x. -The cost of the computation of A k 2 is one inversion in the cyclotomic subgroup and two exponentiations by (x − 1). -The cost of the computation of A k 3 is 2 multiplications, one squaring and one exponentiation by x.
Note that the inversion in the cyclotomic subgroup G φ 3 (p 3 ) of order p 6 + p 3 + 1 is computed as A −1 = A p 3 · A p 6 (see Appendix A for details and cost). The cost for the hard part A d ′ is then 2 exponentiations by x − 1, 5 exponentiations by x, 7 multiplications in F p 9 , one squaring in F p 9 , two cyclotomic inversions I G φ 3 (p 3 ) and p, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 -Frobenius maps. Using the value of x given above, one exponentiation by x costs 43S 9 + 3M 9 whereas one exponentiation by x − 1 costs 43S 9 + 2M 9 . Finally the hard part costs 2(43S 9 + 2M 9 ) + 5(43S 9 + 3M 9 ) + 7M 9 + 1S 9 + 2I G φ 3 (p 3 ) = 302S 9 + 26M 9 + 2I G φ 3 (p 3 ) and p, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 -Frobenius maps. The total cost of the final exponentiation is 1I 9 + 27M 9 + 302S 9 + 2I G φ 3 (p 3 ) and p, p 2 , 2 * p 3 , p 4 , p 5 -Frobenius maps.
Improvement and comparison with previous work
From the results in [31] , the hard part costs 309S 9 + 50M 9 and p, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 -Frobenius maps.
If we include the cost 1I 9 + 1M 9 and p 3 -Frobenius for the easy part and using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost is I 1 + 1115M 1 + 7592S 1 for this work and I 1 + 1943M 1 + 7737S 1 for Le et al. [31] . We therefore save 828M 1 + 145S 1 comparatively to their work. Although the sizes of p are 343 bits in this work and 348 bits in [31] , the cost of a multiplication is almost the same in the two corresponding fields (see section 9.4).
In this section we give explicit formulas together with their cost for the Miller loop in the computation of the optimal ate pairing. We then compute the cost of the final exponentiation on the parameterized elliptic curve defined in [15] . The correctness of the results can be verified in [17] . This family of elliptic curves has embedding degree 15 and a ρ-value 1.5 and is parameterized by :
Optimal ate pairing
The Vercauteren approach described in [42] enabled us to obtain the short vector from the lattice L defined by equation (2) which lead to the optimal function h(z) =
. A straightforward application of formula (1) yields the optimal pairing
Cost of the computation of the Miller loop
In this section, we consider the Miller function given in affine coordinates, following the analysis of Lauter et al. [30] who suggested to use affine coordinates at higher security level. Miller function used for the computation of f x,Q (P ) in this case is described in [44, Table 2 ] with the fastest cost to date. At 192 bits security level on elliptic curves with k = 15, the best value of x we were able to find with a Pari/GP code is x = 2 48 + 2 41 + 2 9 + 2 8 + 1. This value gives an r(x) prime of 385 bits and p(x) of 575 bits which correspond to parameters for 192-bit security level according to Table 2 , the overall cost is 52I 1 + 6819M 1 + 3311S 1 . To our knowledge no explicit cost is reported in the literature in the case k = 15 with a specific value of x.
Cost of the computation of the final exponentiation
The final exponentiation in this case is written in a different way as f (p 15 −1)/r = f p 5 −1 .
We then obtained the following multiple of d: d ′ = 3x 3 d = k 0 +k 1 p+...k 9 p 9 where the polynomials k i , i = 0, ..., 9 are defined as follows
The polynomials k i : i = 0, ...9 verify the relations (see the code in [17] for verification) 
Improvement and comparison with previous work
Considering the previous remark, the cost of the final exponentiation in [31] Table 2 , the overall cost is I 1 + 3066M 1 + 24071S 1 for this work and I 1 + 4236M 1 + 31838S 1 for Le et al. [31] . We therefore save 26M 15 + 175S 15 − 2I G φ 3 (p 5 ) = 1170M 1 + 7767S 1 comparatively to their work. A MAGMA code for the implementation to ensure the correctness of the decomposition of the final exponentiation and the Miller function is available in [17] .
Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 27
The parameterized elliptic curves with embedding degree 27 is defined in [7] . This family has a ρ-value 10/9 and is parameterized by the following polynomials:
The Miller loop and the final exponentiation
The Miller loop and the final exponentiation has been studied in [44] . They found the optimal function h(z) = 17 i=0 c i z i = x − z ∈ Z[z] and the optimal pairing is given by
The authors in [44] used the parameter x = 2 28 + 2 27 + 2 25 + 2 8 − 2 3 for their computation at 256-bit security level. The cost of the Miller step that they obtained is therefore 28(3M 9 +2S 9 +1I 9 + 9M 1 )+4(3M 9 +2S 9 +1I 9 +9M 1 )+27(6S 9 )+30(6M 9 )+1I 27 = 276M 9 +226S 9 +32I 9 +288M 1 +I 27 operations. The computation of the final exponentiation in [44] requires 1I 27 + 11M 27 , 17 powers of x, 2 powers of x − 1 and p, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 , 2 * p 9 -Frobenius maps. Therefore the explicit cost of the final exponentiation is 1I 27 + 17(4(6M 9 ) + 28(6S 9 ) + 36M 1 ) + 2(5(6M 9 ) + 28(6S 9 ) + 36M 1 ) + 11(6M 9 ) + 228M 1 = 1I 27 + 648M 9 + 3192S 9 + 912M 1 . Then the explicit cost for the computation of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation given in that work is 12627M 1 + 8670S 1 + 33I 1 and 24627M 1 + 114998S 1 + 1I 1 respectively (see [44] for details).
Remark 2. The negative coefficient in the value of x affects the efficiency since one full inversion in F p 27 is required in the Miller algorithm (line 8) and also 19 inversions in the cyclotomic subgroup are required when raising to the power of x during the final exponentiation.
In the next section we explain the choice of another parameter to avoid these additional operations.
Improvement and comparison with previous work
We use the arithmetic (especially the computation of inversion in the cyclotomic subgroup) and a specific value of x to improve the costs in [44] . Precisely, a careful search with a Pari/GP code enabled us to find the value x = 2 29 + 2 19 + 2 17 + 2 14 so that r has a prime factor of 514 bits length and the prime p has a bit length of 579 for 256-bit security level according to Table 1 . An adequate elliptic curve has the equation y 2 = x 3 − 2. Although the corresponding base field is a bit larger (579 bits instead of 573 in [44] , but m 579 ≈ m 573 see section 9.4 for notations) and we have an extra doubling step, we avoid the full inversion in F p 27 and 17 inversions in the cyclotomic subgroup G φ 3 (p 9 ) when raising to power x. We perform 2 inversions in the cyclotomic subgroup only when raising to power x − 1. The cost of the Miller loop now becomes 29(3M 9 + 2S 9 + 1I 9 + 9M 1 ) + 3(3M 9 + 2S 9 + 1I 9 + 9M 1 ) + 27(6S 9 ) + 30(6M 9 ) = 276M 9 + 226S 9 + 32I 9 + 288M 1 . Using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost for the Miller loop is 32I 1 + 12240M 1 + 6034S 1 for this work where we saved at least one inversion in F p 27 . Our cost for the final exponentiation is 1I 27 + 17(3(6M 9 ) + 29(6S 9 )) + 2(4(6M 9 ) + 29(6S 9 )) + 2I G φ 3 (p 9 ) + 11(6M 9 ) = 1I 27 + 420M 9 + 3306S 9 + 2I G φ 3 (p 9 ) and p, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 , 2 * p 9 -Frobenius maps. Using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost is I 1 + 15951M 1 + 82862S 1 for this work. The implementation of this pairing is available in [17] .
General Comparison
In this section, we summarize the different costs obtained in this work and compare our results with previous works. If we assume that the cost of a squaring is the same as the cost of a multiplication then the cost of the final exponentiation is I 1 + 27137M 1 and I 1 + 36074M 1 for this work and previous work [31] respectively for k = 15. The theoretical improvement obtained in this work is therefore up to 25%. A similar analysis with k = 9 yields an improvement of 8%. In the case of curves with k = 27, our results present an improvement of 14% and 29% for the Miller loop and final exponentiation respectively compare to the work in [44] . 9 New Parameters for Optimal Ate pairing on Elliptic Curves with embedding degrees 9, 15 and 27
In this section we consider new parameters for parameterized curves of embedding degrees 9, 15 and 27 at the 128, 192 and 256-bit security levels. We consider recent advances on the computation of the discrete logarithm thanks to the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm and its variants described in some papers as mentioned in the introduction. Mostly, the paper of Barbulescu and Duquesne [4] presents a detailed approach for computing new parameters for pairings. Scott and Guillevic [41] have proposed tentative general recommended parameters for classical security level and that we reproduce here in Table 4 . NFS  3072  7680  15360  exTNFS  3618  9241  18480  SexTNFS  5004  12871  27410  Table 4 . Recommended extension fields size (p k ) to obtain desired levels of security [41] .
DL Algorithm AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
Following the Table 4 , we searched for new parameters that will ensure resistance to SexTNFS algorithm at the various security levels for curves of embedding degrees 9, 15 and 27.
9.1 New parameters and costs for optimal ate pairing at the 128-bit security level for k = 9 and k = 15
-Case of k = 9. Following the recommendation from Table 4 , we found the value x = 2 70 + 2 59 + 2 46 + 2 41 + 1. This gives a prime p of 559 bits and a prime r of 419 bits. We proceed as described in Section 5 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The Miller loop costs in this case 70(
This is equal to 73M 9 + 258M 3 + 666M 1 + 69S 9 + 650S 3 . Using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost is 4842M 1 + 4975S 1 . Using the value of x given above, the hard part of the final exponentiation costs 2(70S 9 + 3M 9 ) + 5(70S 9 + 4M 9 ) + 7M 9 + 1S 9 + 2I G φ 3 (p 3 ) = 491S Table 4 , we found the value x = 2 25 + 2 14 +2 17 +2 4 +1. This gives a prime p of 511 bits and a prime factor of r of 410 bits. We proceed as described in section 7 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The Miller loop costs in this case 4(9M 1 + 1I 9 + 2S 9 + 3M 9 )+ 25(9M 1 + 1I 9 + 2S 9 + 3M 9 )+ 24S 27 + 27M 27 . This is equal to 29I 9 + 27M 27 + 87M 9 + 261M 1 + 24S 27 + 58S 9 . Using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost is 29I 9.3 New parameters and costs for pairings at the 256-bits security levels for k = 27 and k = 24
-Case of k = 27. Following the recommendation from Table 4 , we found the value x = 2 51 + 2 42 + 2 28 + 2 9 + 1. This gives a prime p of 1019 bits and a prime factor of r of 883 bits. We proceed as described in section 7 to obtain the cost of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. The Miller loop costs in this case 4(9M 1 + 1I 9 + 2S 9 + 3M 9 ) + 51(9M 1 + 1I 9 + 2S 9 + 3M 9 )+ 50S 27 + 53M 27 . This is equal to 55I 9 + 53M 27 + 165M 9 + 495M 1 + 50S 27 + 110S 9 . Using the arithmetic in Table 2 , the overall cost is 55I 1 + 21348M 1 + 9660S 1 . Using the value of x given above, the final exponentiation costs I 27 + 2(51S 27 + 3M 27 ) + 17(51S 27 + 4M 27 ) + 11M 27 + 2I G φ 3 (p 9 ) and p, p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 , p 6 , p 7 , p 8 , 2 * p 9 -Frobenius maps for a total cost of the final exponentiation
The cost for the case k = 24 are obtained with the parameter given in [4] and the formulas from [2] The following table 7 compares our results with previous results at the 256-bit security level.
Comparison
To make a fair comparison of the results in tables 5, 6 and 7, we take note of the size of the base field. We consider implementations on 64-bit platform. Then following [2] , a F p element is represented with ℓ = 1 + log 2 (p) binary coefficients packed in n 64 = ⌈ ℓ 64 ⌉64 bits processor words and a F p multiplication can be implemented with approximately 2n 2 64 + n 64 operations. We denote m c the cost of a multiplication in the finite field F p where p is of c bits. For the Table  5 we have that m 461 ≈ 1.35m 371 . From this we see that, at the 128-bit security level, the total cost of computing the optimal ate pairing for elliptic curves with k = 15 is 19199m 461 making these curves faster than the well known BN curves but slower than the KSS16 curves found in [4] as the best one at the 128-bit security level. From Table 6 we have that the cost for computing the optimal ate pairing for curves with k = 15 is 166067m 511 as m 863 ≈ 2.98m 511 . We conclude that at the 192-bit security level computing the optimal ate pairing is faster on elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 27 than on curves with k = 15 and in this case the BLS24 curves remain faster. At the 256-bit security level, we have that the BLS24 curves are the faster.
Conclusion
In this work we provided details and important improvements in the computation of the Miller loop and the final exponentiation for the optimal ate pairing on elliptic curves admitting cubic twists. An explicit cost evaluation is given for the Miller loop in the case of elliptic curves of embedding degree 9 and 15. In particular for k = 15 and k = 27 we obtained an improvement, in terms of operations in the base field, of up to 25% and 29% respectively in the computation of the final exponentiation. Also, we obtained that elliptic curves with embedding degree k = 15 present faster results than BN12 curves at the 128-bit security levels. In comparison with curves having even embedding degrees we find that a lot of improvements are still required in the case of curves with odd embedding degree. One could try to compute compressed squarings in this case. To ensure the correctness of all the formulas used in this work, a MAGMA code for the implementation of the three pairings is given. Furthermore, a brief look at the parameters used in this work reveals that the curves with odd embedding degrees studied in this work are not subgroup secure ordinary curves [6] and are not protected against small-subgroup attacks [34] . However this is not a particular case of elliptic curves of odd embedding degree but it appears from [6] that most of such parameters that have been found for curves with even embedding degree such as BN12 curves [8] , KSS16 curves [26] or BLS12 curves [7] do not satisfied these security properties. As future work we could search for parameters to fulfill this security issue.
A Arithmetic in F p 9
Let a = a 0 + a 1 v + a 2 v 2 ∈ F p 9 with a i ∈ F p 3 .
A.1 Cyclotomic inversion
We assume that a lies in the cyclotomic subgroup G φ 3 (p 3 ) , so that a p 6 +p 3 +1 = 1 i.e. a −1 = a p 6 a p 3 . In order to compute a p 6 a p 3 , we need the values of v p 3 and v p 6 . But v p 3 = v 3(p 3 −1)/3+1 = v 3(p 3 −1)/3 v = (v 3 ) (p 3 −1)/3 v = (7 1/3 ) (p 3 −1)/3 v since v 3 = 7 1/3 . Let µ = (7 1/3 ) (p 3 −1)/3 ; we have µ = 1 and µ 3 = 1 so that µ is a primitive cubic root of unity in F p 3 . We obtain v p 3 = µv and v p 6 = (v p 3 ) p 3 = (µv) p 3 = µ(v) p 3 = µµv = µ 2 v. We then have a p 3 = a 2 (v 2 ) p 3 = a 0 + a 1 v p 3 + a 2 (v 2 ) p 3 = a 0 + a 1 µv + a 2 µ 2 v 2 and a p 6 = (a p 3 ) p 3 = a 0 + a 1 (µv) p 3 + a 2 (µ 2 v 2 ) p 3 = a 0 + a 1 µ 2 v + a 2 µ 4 v 2 . So that when using v 3 = 7 1/3 and φ 3 (µ) = µ 2 + µ + 1 = 0, we finally have: 
A.2 Frobenius operators
The p i −Frobenius is the map π i : F p 9 → F p 9 , a → a p i . Let a ∈ F p 9 , a = a 0 + a 1 v + a 2 v 2 with a i ∈ F p 3 then π(a) = a p 0 + a
p . Now a 0 ∈ F p 3 can be written as a 0 = g 0 + g 1 u + g 2 u 2 , g i ∈ F p so that a p 0 = g 0 + g 1 u p + g 2 (u 2 ) p . We have u p = u 3(p−1)/3+1 = (u 3 ) (p−1)/3 u = 7 (p−1)/3 u and since 7 is not a cube in F p , 7 (p−1)/3 = 1. Let α = 7 (p−1)/3 then α = 1 and α 3 = 1; it means that α is a primitive cubic root of unity in F p and u p = αu. Therefore a p 0 = g 0 + g 1 u p + g 2 (u 2 ) p = g 0 + g 1 αu + g 2 α 2 u 2 and similarly a p 1 = g 3 + g 4 u p + g 5 (u 2 ) p = g 3 + g 4 αu + g 5 α 2 u 2 and a p 2 = g 6 + g 7 u p + g 8 (u 2 ) p = g 6 + g 7 αu + g 8 α 2 u 2 . Now for the computation of v p observe that v p = v 3(p−1)/3+1 = (v 3 ) (p−1)/3 v = (7 1/3 ) (p−1)/3 v = 7 (p−1)/9 v so that if β = 7 (p−1)/9 then we have β = 1, β 3 = 7 (p−1)/3 = α = 1, β 9 = 1. Thus β is a primitive ninth root of unity in F p and v p = βv. Finally a p = g 0 + g 1 αu + g 2 α 2 u 2 + (g 3 β + g 4 αβu + g 5 α 2 βu 2 )v + (g 6 β 2 + g 7 αβ 2 u + g 8 α 2 β 2 u 2 )v 2 and the following algebraic relations: α = β 3 , αβ = β 4 , αβ 2 = β 5 , α 2 β = β 7 , α 2 β 2 = β 8 yield to a p = (g 0 + g 1 β 3 u + g 2 β 6 u 2 ) + (g 3 β + g 4 β 4 u + g 5 β 7 u 2 )v + (g 6 β 2 + g 7 β 5 u + g 8 β 8 u 2 )v 2 . The cost of p-Frobenius: 8M 1 . This is the same as the cost of p 2 , p 4 , p 5 , p 7 and p 8 -Frobenius. For the p 3 -Frobenius operator, observe from A.1 that v p 3 = µv. Then a p 3 = a 0 + a 1 µv + a 2 µ 2 v 2 = (g 0 + g 1 u + g 2 u 2 ) + (g 3 + g 4 u + g 5 u 2 )µv + (g 6 + g 7 u + g 8 u 2 )µ 2 v 2 . As t = µ 2 is precomputed; we finally have a p 3 = (g 0 + g 1 u + g 2 u 2 ) + (g 3 µ + g 4 µu + g 5 µu 2 )v + (g 6 t + g 7 tu + g 8 tu 2 )v 2 . The cost of p 3 -Frobenius: 6M 1 . This is the same as the cost of p 6 -Frobenius.
